​Today’s episode is our first of 2026, focused squarely on the latest economic headlines—and what they mean for your wallet, your work, and the direction of the country.

Washington has been busy. From another federal budget fight and renewed debates over health care subsidies, to fresh inflation data and major corporate developments, policymakers are already setting the tone for the year ahead. The choices being made now will shape whether families see real relief—or continued pressure—from higher costs and slower growth.

In this episode, we’ll look beyond the headlines to examine what’s really driving these developments, where policy is helping—or hurting—affordability, and what leaders should prioritize if they’re serious about restoring growth and prosperity in 2026. Tune in to the full episode on YouTube, Apple Podcast, or Spotify, and visit my website for more information.

​If you’ve ever wondered why it’s easier to order groceries on your phone than to legally cut hair, start a home business, or switch careers, this episode explains exactly what’s gone wrong.

America’s labor policies are stuck in the past—designed for a 1930s economy that no longer exists. Meanwhile, workers have moved on. They want flexibility. They want choice. They want opportunity. And increasingly, government is standing in the way.

My guest is Austen Bannan, Workforce Policy Fellow at Americans for Prosperity and one of the sharpest voices making the case for worker freedom over bureaucratic control. Austen works at the intersection of labor policy, occupational licensing, and education reform—where outdated rules quietly crush opportunity for millions of Americans.

This is a conversation about why empowering workers—not protecting systems—is essential if we actually want people to prosper.

🎧 Listen to the full episode of the Let People Prosper Show, and subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or YouTube. You can also find more of my work at vanceginn.com and vanceginn.substack.com.

Originally published at Pelican Institute. 

​You can download the full report here. 

Originally published on Substack. 

​President Trump wants to cap credit card interest rates at 10% compared with the 20%+ most cards charge today. The justification is familiar: credit card rates are high, many households feel squeezed, and the government should step in to protect consumers.

That argument sounds appealing. But it rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of how credit markets work. Fortunately, Republicans in Congress are pushing back on this bad idea but ignore the damage already being done by another price-control proposal moving through Congress: the Credit Card Competition Act.

Together, these ideas reflect the same error: treating prices we don’t like as proof that markets are failing. They aren’t.

Credit Is a Price for Risk and Time​

Credit is not free money. It is an agreement across time. A lender provides money today and gets repaid later, if all goes well.

Interest rates exist to manage that uncertainty. They reflect risk, the time value of money, inflation, and opportunity cost. Lending money today means it cannot be used elsewhere tomorrow.

Interest rates are not moral judgments. They are prices.

Capping interest rates does not eliminate risk. It prevents risk from being priced. When prices are forced below what risk requires, lenders respond the same way suppliers always do: they reduce supply.

That reduction hits marginal borrowers first.

Who Uses Credit—and Who Loses It When Prices Are Controlled

According to Federal Reserve survey data, more than 80 percent of U.S. households have at least one credit card, and most cardholders prefer using credit cards for everyday purchases. That access exists because lenders are allowed to price risk. But access is not equal.

Lower-income households are less likely to have credit cards. When they do, they are more likely to carry balances, especially during emergencies. These households rely on flexible credit the most—and they are the first to lose access when lending standards tighten.

A rate cap doesn’t protect them. It prices them out.

Big Debt Numbers Don’t Mean the Market Is Broken
​
Supporters of price controls often point to debt totals. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, total household debt is about $18.6 trillion, including roughly $1.2 trillion in credit card balances, which make up about 20 percent of all non-housing debt.

Debt size alone doesn’t indicate failure. Repayment does.
​
About 12.4 percent of credit card balances are 90 or more days delinquent—elevated compared with recent years and near levels seen during the Great Financial Crisis.

Here’s the key point: there were no federal interest-rate caps during the financial crisis or the pandemic, and the credit card market did not collapse. Losses rose, lending tightened temporarily, and repayment normalized.

There is no new emergency today that suddenly justifies government price setting.

The Math Behind Credit Cards

Credit cards are expensive to operate. As outlined by the Committee to Unleash Prosperity, lenders face roughly:

• 4 percent in funding costs
• 6 percent in expected credit losses
• 5 percent in administration, fraud prevention, and collections

That’s more than 15 percent in costs before earning any return.

A 10 percent cap guarantees losses for many borrowers.
​
When losses are guaranteed, lenders respond logically. They tighten approval standards. They lower limits. They close accounts with weaker credit histories. Credit becomes concentrated among the safest borrowers.

That isn’t punishment. It’s arithmetic.

The Credit Card Competition Act Repeats the Same Mistake

Interest-rate caps aren’t the only price controls on the table. Congress is also considering the Credit Card Competition Act, which would force banks to route transactions over government-preferred payment networks.

Supporters claim this would lower costs. In reality, it suppresses another price in the credit system.

As explained in a coalition letter led by Americans for Tax Reform, payment-network revenue funds:

• Fraud prevention and cybersecurity
• Network reliability and innovation
• Rewards programs like cash-back and travel points

When that revenue is reduced, those benefits don’t disappear evenly.

Rewards are cut first for everyday cardholders and small businesses. High-balance, premium users are protected the longest. Once again, costs don’t vanish—they get shifted.

The Credit Card Competition Act and interest-rate caps are two versions of the same policy instinct: control prices first, deal with consequences later.

Who Decides?

Both proposals rest on the idea that consumers make poor choices and need protection from themselves. That assumes policymakers can judge the tradeoffs facing millions of households better than individuals can.

Economic decisions are subjective. What looks irresponsible from the outside may be rational given income volatility, medical bills, or short-term shocks. We cannot observe the alternatives people reject.

Replacing individual judgment with political judgment isn’t economics.

It’s paternalism.

Closing Thoughts

Price controls don’t work. They don’t work for housing, labor, energy, or credit.

Capping interest rates and regulating payment networks won’t make credit cheaper for everyone. They will make it scarcer, reduce benefits, and limit options—especially for the people who rely on credit the most.

The price of credit is still a price. Suppress it, and the consequences follow.

Good intentions don’t change bad economics.

Originally published on Substack. 

​Texas ranks fourth nationally with an overall score of 8.15 in the Economic Freedom of North America report recently published by the Fraser Institute.

The ranking, based on 2023 data, places Texas firmly among the most economically free states in the country.
​
But the more important signal in the data is not where Texas ranks now. It is how the state has had excessive spending and high property taxes weigh on economic freedom today and in the coming years.

Texas’s economic success is visible first in the labor market.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Texas had one of the fastest job creation rates in 2023 (and thereafter). Employment growth has consistently exceeded the national average, while unemployment rates have generally remained below the U.S. rate.

When marginal tax rates on work are zero and labor markets are flexible, employers expand, and workers respond.

The economic output data tell the same story.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that Texas’s real GDP growth was a leader in 2023, driven by private-sector expansion. Capital flows toward jurisdictions where expected after-tax returns are higher, and policy risk is lower. Texas has benefited from that reality for decades.

The EFNA index explains why.

Texas scores well on taxation and labor-market regulation, largely because it imposes no personal income tax and maintains comparatively flexible employment rules. Those institutional features reduce distortions on work, saving, and investment, raising long-run growth potential.

Yet the same EFNA data also reveal why Texas’s ranking has flattened rather than improved in recent years. The binding constraint today is not necessarily taxes or labor policy. It is government spending growth at the state and local levels.

Since at least the mid-2010s, state and local spending in Texas has grown substantially faster than population growth plus inflation, meaning government now consumes a larger share of personal income than it once did.

EFNA measures spending relative to income because this ratio determines how much private activity is crowded out. When the government expands faster than the economy and taxes rise to fund it, economic freedom declines.

Property taxes are the primary transmission mechanism.

Texas constitutionally bans income taxes, wealth taxes, and state property taxes, but relies heavily on sales taxes to fund state spending and local property taxes to finance local budgets.

Property-tax collections have risen faster than household incomes, raising effective tax rates even when statutory rates appear unchanged.

From an economic perspective, this is not neutral. Higher property taxes can raise the cost of housing and capital formation, reduce real wages over time, and slow investment, especially in high-tax metropolitan areas.

Public-sector employment growth reinforces the trend.

BLS data show government employment rising faster than private employment in recent years. EFNA penalizes this pattern because it signals higher future tax burdens or debt service.

Economic theory predicts the outcome: slower productivity growth and weaker private-sector dynamism.

Directionally, Texas has held its rank while peer states have closed the gap. That is an important distinction.

The EFNA report relies on 2023 data, which means recent policy changes about restraint are not yet reflected. What is reflected is the cumulative effect of spending decisions made over the past decade.

Rankings move slowly because institutions change slowly. That is a feature, not a flaw.

The Fraser Institute’s findings are consistent across time and geography. States with higher economic freedom exhibit higher income levels, stronger labor-force participation, faster job creation, and greater net in-migration.

Texas still benefits from those advantages. But the data now show that fiscal drift could erode the margin.

The lesson is not ideological. It is arithmetic. Economic freedom helped build the Texas Model. Preserving it now requires discipline.

If government spending growth continues to outpace population growth plus inflation, Texas’s comparative advantage will narrow, then disappear. Growth can mask that reality for a while. It cannot undo it.