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Originally published on Substack.
Shareholders who believe a company is being sold unfairly should have a way to defend their property rights. But what happens when investors buy shares after a merger is announced because those shares also provide an opportunity to challenge the price in court? That question is at the heart of the appraisal fight over Silver Lake’s acquisition of Endeavor Group Holdings. It also raises a broader question for policymakers: Do Delaware’s rules protect property rights while keeping the costs of investing and doing business low? A $4.1 Billion Fight Silver Lake acquired Endeavor in March 2025 for $27.50 per share, giving the company a roughly $13 billion equity value. The price was a 55% premium over Endeavor’s stock price before it announced a review of strategic alternatives. Yet shareholders holding exactly 149,250,809 shares sought appraisal. Those shares were worth about $4.1 billion at the deal price. Under Section 262 of Delaware law, qualifying shareholders in certain mergers can reject the merger price and ask the Court of Chancery to determine the “fair value” of their shares. That protection can be valuable when shareholders believe insiders or controlling owners have treated them unfairly. But incentives matter. Buying Into the Lawsuit Some investors can purchase shares after a merger has already been announced and then seek appraisal. They know the proposed deal price before investing and can pursue a higher court-determined value. Research shows why this can be attractive. A major study of Delaware appraisal cases from 2000 through 2014 found that petitions increasingly shifted from individual shareholders toward specialized hedge funds. Petitioners earned an average annualized excess return of 32.9%. But there is another side. The researchers also found appraisal claims were more common in deals involving possible conflicts of interest, going-private transactions, minority squeeze-outs, and low acquisition premiums. Appraisal can therefore provide a useful check on unfair transactions. The policy challenge is preserving that protection without making litigation itself an attractive investment strategy. Rules Change Behavior Delaware has already seen what happens when incentives change. The state amended its appraisal law in 2016, and Delaware Supreme Court decisions later gave greater weight to market evidence such as the negotiated deal price. Appraisal filings subsequently fell sharply. Research covering 2015 through 2019 found that average deal-level gross returns from appraisal arbitrage fell to 13.2%, compared with 98.2% during 2000–2014. Even more telling, the judicially determined value relative to the deal price averaged negative 5.3% in the later period. That is an important lesson for policymakers: Rules change incentives, and incentives change behavior. Litigation Is Not Free Buyers consider more than the purchase price when deciding whether to acquire a company. They also consider financing, taxes, regulations, legal expenses, and litigation risk. If those expected costs rise, buyers may offer shareholders less, demand higher returns, or walk away from marginal deals. Litigation risk can therefore operate much like a tax on investment. Government may not collect the money, but the added cost still affects decisions and redirects resources that could otherwise finance businesses, innovation, and workers. Why Delaware Matters This matters nationwide because Delaware is home to more than 2.28 million business entities and more than two-thirds of the Fortune 500. Nearly 70% of U.S. companies completing initial public offerings in 2025 chose Delaware. Delaware’s competitive advantage has long included predictable corporate law. Policymakers should protect it. Shareholders deserve meaningful protection against unfair transactions. But policymakers should also examine whether buying shares after a merger announcement should provide the same opportunities to profit from appraisal litigation. The goal should be clear: protect property rights, enforce contracts, keep the rules predictable, and minimize unnecessary barriers to voluntary transactions. When legal uncertainty makes productive investment more expensive, fewer opportunities may make economic sense. Better rules can protect shareholders while allowing more capital to flow toward productive uses that help people prosper.
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Vance Ginn, Ph.D.
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